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Abstract 
 
The international voluntary carbon market allows economic actors to profit financially 
by selling carbon reduction projects (as carbon credits) in the marketplace. The 
objective of this work is to examine the ideology of that market and its implications for 
crime and climate change. More specifically, we compare advertising messages for two 
sets of actors in the voluntary carbon market: criminal and non-criminal organizations. 
To carry out this analysis we draw upon a grounded theory approach to analyze 
marketing websites for a sample of organizations that sell credits. We discover that 
overall, organizations draw upon ecological modernization ideology to provide 
opportunities to gain access to investors and victims by emphasizing (1) sustainability; 
(2) ethical behaviour; (3) economic development; and, (4) technological innovation. 
Importantly, statistical analyses failed to differentiate between the forms of 
modernization ideology employed by legal and illegal actors. 
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Everyone who participates in or studies the carbon offset market know that it is a haven 
for con artists − Lohmann (2009, p. 4) 
 
Introduction 
In 1992 The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(hereafter UNFCCC) was formed as an international treaty to identify, recommend and 
implement a range of mechanisms to address climate change and other environmental 
problems (Gouldson and Murphy 1997). In 1997 the UNFCCC employed the Kyoto 
Protocol to validate a universal goal to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, 
allowing countries to ratify legally binding targets to reduce GHG’s and manage these 
targets through an international emission’s trading system made up of two market 
platforms: voluntary and involuntary. Both voluntary and involuntary markets have 
expanded [1] despite on-going criticism that they have little to no impact in reducing 
emissions (Lohmann et al. 2006; Pearse and Böhm 2015). 
Parallel to the legitimate market platforms, an illegal “market” for carbon crime is 
drawing the attention of criminologists, sociologists and political scientists (Bachram 
2004; Bianchi et al. 2010; Frunza et al. 2011; Gibbs et al. 2013; Lohmann 2009; Martin 
and Walters 2013; Walters and Martin 2013; Williams 2013). While much has been 
done to examine carbon crime in the involuntary market, there is room to further expand 
this area of study with respect to the voluntary market (see also Walters and Martin 
2012). The purpose of this research is to explore the major marketing themes in the 
voluntary carbon market and determine whether criminal and non-criminal 
organizations in that market employ different themes. Both the identification of themes 
as well as the differentiation of organizations by themes is interesting and important. 
From an orthodox standpoint, the identification of unique criminal characteristics could 
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provide information that helps regulators profile potential carbon credit thieves—
perhaps providing political support for the international market by demonstrating it can 
be successful with more information and better regulation. From a more critical 
standpoint, however, the comparison between legal and illegal actors may also highlight 
an important contradiction of capitalism by suggesting that voluntary carbon credit 
ideology itself creates motivated offenders and suitable targets that ultimately serve to 
undermine the credibility of that system as a solution to climate change. This second 
explanation is the one advocated by Lohmann (2009) in his assessment of the carbon 
credit market.  
To determine if it is possible to distinguish between criminal and non-criminal 
organizations we examine themes that emerge from the websites of organizations that 
sell carbon credits. We obtained data on all carbon credit organizations that are 
classified as criminal by the UK’s Financial Conduct Authority (N=10) and compared 
them to ten randomly chosen legal carbon-trading organizations. Prior to presenting the 
findings of that analysis, we examine the global approach to carbon markets. Next, we 
briefly examine the structure, rationale and potential crime implications for the 
involuntary and voluntary carbon markets. After the statistical analysis of the difference 
between criminal and non-criminal organizations we examine the marketing 
opportunities for crime in the voluntary carbon market by exploring themes that 
organizations use to sell carbon credits. 
Background 
One of the biggest challenges facing the globalized world is climate change (IPCC 
2014a, 2014b). The anthropogenic actions of the industrialization process are causing 
significant environmental damage, including a documented increase in the earth’s 
temperature. As the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) formed in 
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1988 under the guidance of the UNFCCC notes, the environmental consequences of 
climate change will not only impact social inequality, but radically transform the 
geographical makeup (e.g. deforestation, rise in ocean waters, etc.) of the world as it 
stands today (Pearse and Böhm 2015). Warnings about climate change have not gone 
unnoticed by governments. For example, the UNFCCC formed, in part, as a global 
governance strategy and as a response to the increasing awareness of environmental 
problems and impacts of climate change. The adoption of UNFCCC was, according to 
some scholars, the leading edge of a social transformation that would incorporate 
ecological welfare into political-economic structures (Spaargaren and Mol 2013). The 
birth of UNFCCC and the idea that the ecology is increasingly important and beneficial 
to the economy is now understood in terms of ecological modernization theory (or 
EMT).[2] EMT emerged to explain the concerted policy and market efforts that are a 
response to the failings of individual states to address ecological problems (Jänicke 
1990; Mol et al. 2009). It provides a complex understanding of post-industrial society, 
and the increasing importance of the ecology, and the role of governments in 
emphasizing environmental policy to attain pollution reduction (Anderson and Massa 
2000; Christoff 1996; Gouldson and Murphy 1997; Hajer 1995; Harvey 1993; Huber 
1982; Jänicke et al. 1993; Weale 1993). In short, EMT emphasizes the importance of 
both the economy and ecology and those solutions rooted in technological innovation 
and markets (Böhm et al. 2012; Gouldson and Murphy 1997).[3] Influential EMT 
advocates Mol and Spaargaren (2000) claim that EMT explains how a political-
economic pathway can protect the interests of the environment and economic growth in 
light of environmental challenges faced by modern society. Subsequent policy 
developments inspired by the theory have incorporated the state acting as a regulator to 
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market mechanisms, technological advancements and fostered a relationship with civil 
society based on an environmental ethic (Jänicke 1990).[4] 
The Kyoto protocol is a legally binding agreement amongst UNFCCC members to 
meet greenhouse gas emissions reduction targets and marks the second wave of 
ecological modernization that relies on autonomous market mechanisms and 
independent financial actors and investors within a transnational global policy network 
to decarbonise the global economy (Spaargaren and Mol 2013). The commodification of 
carbon dioxide – and the technological innovation, research and development 
surrounding that market – can be viewed as market based solutions to the problem of 
climate change since carbon credits were now introduced as one cost of doing business. 
As a result, Newell and Paterson (2010) suggest this is the era of “Climate Capitalism.” 
That is, both the voluntary and involuntary markets are used as a viable response to 
climate changes without overhauling “the existing system as a precondition for 
achieving sustainability” (Newell 2010, p.5). Therefore, the decarbonisation of the 
economy is shaped around current political-economic structures, enacting the same 
operations as traditional financial markets. Spaargaren and Mol (2013) see carbon 
market developments as a symbol of reflexive modernity. The international carbon 
markets are a mechanism to manage environmental problems in an interconnected 
global society (Newell and Paterson 2010). 
While ecological modernization is often used to describe the way that the world is 
addressing the issue of climate change, especially through the use of carbon markets, we 
argue that the reliance on carbon markets to solve the problem of ecological destruction 
caused by capitalism is ineffective and opens up significant opportunities for crime. 
That is, our view is that crime in the carbon market is a result of our observations of the 
neo-liberal framework and therefore serves a critical function of capitalism in that it 
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allows for the continuation of economic growth. [5] We now turn to the issue of crime 
in the carbon market to expand upon our position. 
Carbon Markets and Crime 
To understand carbon crime, it is important to appreciate that the market is split 
into involuntary (i.e., “compliance”) and voluntary sectors. The involuntary sector is 
based on an international emissions trading system as well as national and regional 
compulsory markets (Bayon et al. 2007) [6] Most markets are composed of three 
flexible mechanisms known as (1) Cap and Trade (or CAP), (2) Clean Development 
Mechanisms (or CDM) and (3) Joint Implementation (or JI). The CAP mechanism 
works by allowing countries to buy and sell carbon credits so that countries that release 
more pollution can buy credits from countries that release less pollution. The CDM 
mechanism allows a country to receive additional carbon credits for providing financial 
support to carbon reduction projects in countries that tend to rely on carbon intensive 
industry. Finally, the Joint Implementation (JI) mechanism allows industrialized 
countries to purchase carbon credits that are generated by projects in other industrialized 
countries. 
Although regulatory bodies have taken the lead in the development of CDM’s and 
JI, it is generally down to the actions of private actors and civil society institutions that 
control these projects to attract the neo-liberal capitalist actors to increase wealth and 
market power. As might be expected, most studies of carbon crime are based on 
problems in the involuntary market as the majority of the attention on carbon reduction 
efforts is focused on these markets (see Bachram 200; Bianchi et al. 2010; Frunza et al. 
2011; Gibbs et al. 2013; Lohmann 2009; Martin and Walters 2013; Walters and Martin 
2012; Williams 2013). For instance, Martin and Walters (2013) analyse four case 
studies identifying potential threats including computer, state and taxation crime; scams; 
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corruption; and structural fraud emerging as the result of poor regulation. Not only does 
this criminal activity take place frequently as the researchers note, it also contributes to 
market failure and therefore allows problems to continue. Importantly, Gibbs et al. 
(2013) rely on Cohen and Felson’s (1979) theory of routine activities to explain how the 
involuntary market can produce opportunities for carbon crime in the European Union 
ETS. They used mental models to pin point potential points of crime. For example, 
many carbon markets rely on an electronic registration process that is vulnerable to 
hackers, who can steal credits and obtain information in order to send scam emails 
requesting financial and account details as part of an individual’s investment process. 
Bachram (2004) identifies this problem as the result of a laissez-faire environment that 
reduces the role of government in free markets allowing fraud to be committed by large 
corporations. While Bachram does not draw upon a rational choice perspective as an 
explanation of carbon crime, it is not difficult to imagine a link between routine 
activities theory and ecological modernization ideology as an explanation of carbon 
crime. That is, the implication exists that ecological modernization opens up 
opportunities for criminogenic markets because markets actors (e.g. corporations, 
industry interest groups, etc.) sell the hegemonic idea that we can have environmental 
protection through green technology. 
Frunza et al. (2011) also studied the involuntary carbon crime market and note 
that the impact of carbon crime is extensive when nation-states are considered victims. 
For instance, tax fraud accounts for nearly 60 percent of money lost because of crime in 
the involuntary carbon market between 2008 and 2009. Williams (2013) also suggests 
that the market creates a tremendous opportunity for significant amounts of money 
laundering. 
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In this research we focus on crime in voluntary carbon markets. Actors in the 
voluntary markets freely choose to invest and sell credits in projects that lower or offset 
greenhouse gas emissions. These carbon reduction projects are normally located in the 
global South. Bayon et al. (2007) provide an example of the voluntary market using the 
AES Corporation as an example. The AES strategy to reduce the company’s carbon 
footprint in the U.S. relied on the purchasing of carbon offsets that were generated by 
employing Guatemalan farmers to plant trees, thereby increasing carbon sequestration. 
[7] In most instances, however, voluntary carbon markets appear to rely on advances in 
technology to develop alternative energy sources or reduce current carbon emissions 
(Taiyab 2005).  
As voluntary carbon reduction projects have developed over time, investors have 
begun to find and market those projects to companies that would like operations to be 
viewed as “carbon neutral.” As a result, a company in a developed country can invest in 
a carbon reduction project in a developing country to “offset” the harm caused by their 
carbon emissions. Voluntary carbon reduction projects are therefore developed, verified, 
brokered and sold. It is within this market and its ecological modernization ideology 
that crime emerges. That is, voluntary markets are viewed as a practical solution for 
economic growth and environmental protection but can also facilitate opportunities for 
crime. Lohmann (2009) stresses the opportunities for corruption that allows negative 
social and environmental costs to continue (see also Böhm et al. 2012). Yet despite 
these criticisms, voluntary markets exist. 
For purposes of understanding crime in the voluntary carbon market, it is 
important to understand that the market operates on a “buyer beware” philosophy. In 
2013, Interpol uncovered and presented a global map of the types of criminal activity 
within the voluntary carbon markets that include the false selling of carbon credits, 
11	  	  
exploitation of weak regulations, tax and security fraud, money laundering and internet 
crimes (Interpol 2013). The conclusion stressed that the simultaneous goals of profit 
maximization and greenhouse gas reduction are not compatible. In the UK the Financial 
Conduct Authority (or FCA) has taken an interest in voluntary carbon fraud in the UK. 
The FCA specifically reports on its website (10 October 2014),  
 “…You may be offered carbon credit certificates, voluntary emission 
reductions (VERs), certified emission reductions (CERs) or an opportunity 
to invest directly in a ’green‘ scheme or project that generates carbon 
credits as a return on investment. Carbon credits and VERs certificates are 
often labelled as ‘certified’, but this certification is voluntary and involves a 
wide range of bodies and different quality standards that are not recognized 
by any UK compensation scheme. The caller may claim carbon credits are 
‘the new big thing’ in commodity trading, industries now have to off-set 
their emissions, the government is focusing on green developments or that it 
is a growing market” (FCA, 2014)  
Overall, the FCA warning identifies how individuals and small organizations do invest 
in these illegal voluntary markets, which have been influenced by policy derivatives 
prescribed by ecological modernization.  That is, we argue that because some people 
subscribe to ecological modernization as a solution to environmental problems (e.g., 
that technology and the market can solve the environmental crises) they invest in these 
projects—some of which are illegal. Thus, voluntary actors in the market use the 
language of business to address environmental problems, combining it with ecological 
modernization discourse to create a new product that has more than simple commodity 
value within the capitalist market tradition (Spaargaren and Mol 2013).  Previous 
research suggests that carbon credits and offsets appear as an eco-friendly, politically 
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reputable investment (Lohmann 2012). Thus, carbon is an artificial commodity, a 
symbolic, permit-like or liability agreement (Martin and Walters, 2013) marketed as the 
same type of commodity such as fair trade produce (Lovell et al. 2009).  Bryant and 
Goodman (2004) suggest, for instance, that carbon is a conservation seeking commodity 
providing long term ecological and social development that is consistent with Hajer’s 
(1995) vision of ecological modernization. This particular discourse specifically 
designed under ecological modernization perspective has not only formed this approach 
to a low carbon economy, but also the legal and illegal advertising practices used to 
engage investors. Thus, the opportunity for carbon crime in the voluntary market is 
situated in a call to action to do something about environmental problems (Gouldner 
1976) while it is simultaneously situated in a system of regulation that conceals 
environmentally responsible discourse and promotes criminal behavior that harms the 
environment over the long run (Foster 2000) 
Gouldson and Murphy (1997) argue those selling carbon credits and offsets utilise 
the regulatory process that exists within large and small business resulting in a 
collective ecological corporate culture (Lovell et al. 2009). This has contributed to the 
introduction of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) reports; a non-binding agreement 
that allows small and large businesses to demonstrate a connection between social and 
ecological welfare and economics (Aguilera et al. 2007). The purpose of these reports is 
to be a tool for business practice change by incorporating ecological modernized goals. 
At face value this practice of investing in the voluntary market suggests a contribution 
to the welfare of communities (Tate et al. 2010) and appear altruistic (see Aguilera et al. 
2007). Yet Bakker (2010) and Polonsky et al. (2010) argue it may simply be green 
washing the industry. That is, corporations invest in the voluntary carbon market to 
make a false appearance of ecological welfare to the public and stakeholders. 
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The voluntary market also allows for the personal regulation of carbon flows 
because individuals believe they can offset their consumption practices through the 
market (Spaargaren and Mol 2013). For example, individuals can put the details of their 
consumption practices into a calculator (e.g., number of miles travelled by air) to 
determine their individual contribution to the carbon footprint. This footprint can then 
be offset by purchasing carbon credits that promote projects in the voluntary market 
(Lovell et al. 2009). It is not surprising that researchers such as Gillenwater et al. (2007) 
suggests that this type of investment practice is based on a rational choice to justify the 
continued polluting activities by paying a small amount for a different consumer to 
lower their pollution. Kotchen (2009) takes this justification idea further and suggests it 
is also a process to reduce guilt whilst maintaining the same problematic relationship 
between pollution and resource depletion. It is the ideology of ecological modernization 
and its resulting faith in the market that is played out at the individual level. The 
investment in the carbon market reduces the capacity of individuals to re-evaluate 
consumption practices and the effect those practices have on the earth systems. [8] We 
now turn to the main purpose of this work which is to examine how these modernization 
messages show up in criminal and non-criminal websites used for marketing carbon 
credits and determine if there is a difference in the messages the two sets of actors use. 
Data and Methods 
We have argued that the voluntary carbon market is constituted within an 
ecological modernization agenda. Our present concern is to examine how crime in the 
market is supported by modernization ideology. A qualitative approach is used to locate 
ecological modernization themes that exist amongst a convenience sample of identified 
illegally acting carbon trading organisations in the UK. [9] The offending organisations 
in the sample come from the FCA and represent those organizations that have been 
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identified as acting illegally within the UK carbon market between the years of 
2011−2014 (see http://www.fca.org.uk). The FCA reports that there are ten 
organizations that are currently in operation which investors should avoid because they 
are running possible investment scams and likely engaged in fraud and identity theft. 
For each of the companies we were able to access organization websites and use the 
materials on those websites to carry out a thematic analysis to determine how these 
organizations drew upon an ecological modernization framework to facilitate their 
carbon crime. We rely on a grounded theory approach (Glaser and Strauss 2012 [1967]) 
to identify themes used by illegal organizations as they were reported on the 
organizational websites used to attract customers. [10] To attract victims, the criminal 
carbon organizations appear to use the same advertising mechanisms as the non-
criminal carbon traders, providing examples of projects and companies that improve 
environmental performance. However, to gain access to organization details and more 
specific financial benefits, victims were required to provide additional personal details 
so that they could be “contacted” by a member of the organization. We were able to 
construct the following themes from the publically available information on the 
organization websites: (1) sustainability; (2) ethical behaviour; (3) economic 
development; and, (4) technological innovation. [11] We then compared the ecological 
modernization themes found in illegal UK organizations with those that appeared in a 
random sample of legal UK carbon trading organization to determine if illegal and legal 
organizations discuss the benefits of carbon trading differently. The random sample of 
ten legal organizations was taken from the ENDS Carbon Offsets Directory 
(http://www.endscarbonoffsets.com). The list of voluntary carbon-offset brokers is 
located in Appendix A of that directory). 
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To determine whether legal and illegal carbon offset brokers send out different 
ecological modernization messages we first quantitatively compare ecological 
modernization themes between illegal and legal carbon trading organizations. Next, we 
report qualitative data from individual organization websites that illustrates how 
organizations use these themes to attract potential investors.  
Results 
Table 1 displays the percentage of criminal and non-criminal carbon trading 
organizations that employ one of the identified ecological modernization themes (i.e., 
sustainability, ethical behaviour, economic development, and technological innovation) 
that emerged in the grounded theory portion of the analysis. The table indicates that 
there are no statistically significant differences in the percentages of actors in each 
category. For example, when we examined the differences in the proportions of these 
two sets of actors using both chi-square and Fisher’s Exact test we found no difference 
between the two sets of actors (p<0.05) for any of the modernizations themes. Thus, the 
type of ecological message sent to investors and victims appears to be statistically 
identical. 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
We now examine these ecological modernization themes in more detail, providing 
examples of how each theme appears when marketing carbon credits to investors and 
victims.  
Sustainability 
The carbon trading market has been set up as part of the economic and policy 
directives that attempt to combine economic growth with environmental welfare. To 
attract victims and investors to the voluntary trading sector, the illicit organizations use 
online advertising to market the increasing supply and demand for carbon credits and 
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offset, as part of the wider environmental reforms within the financial market. This 
forms the foundation of green market advertising that mirrors legally operating 
organisations.  
Similar to non-criminal traders, criminal traders combine the opportunity to make 
profit and prevent further environmental deterioration through environmental 
technological reform that ensures future sustainability. To attract victims, criminal 
organizations prioritise the problem of climate change, environmental deterioration and 
animal extinction; one of the most “pressing” issues facing the world. However, these 
problems can be stopped by buying credits and making production sustainable. That is, 
individuals can buy credits to “reduce carbon footprints” and improve worldwide 
“sustainability” through the investment of offset projects. In total, 18 of the 20 
organizations (90%) noted that “sustainability” could be achieved by encouraging a 
voluntary carbon market. Moreover, sustainability could be achieved while making a 
profit. For example, one legally operating actor suggests that investors should “provide 
a loan and earn 5% [to] help build more sustainable, self-sufficient communities.” 
While one criminal organization states “[our company] can help your entity better 
understand how focusing on sustainability can benefit now and avert risks later.” In 
short, the language of sustainability is consistent across legal and illegal actors. 
Ethical Behaviour 
Seventeen of the twenty organizations in the sample advertise that investments in 
carbon credits are acts of social and environmental responsibility. This marketing angle 
advertises “environmental justice” because carbon credit investment is the right thing to 
do for low-income countries to help them live sustainable lifestyles. This is marketed 
through advertising slogans such as “social and environmentally responsible 
investment” and “helping other parts of the world.” The data demonstrate how both 
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legal and illegal organisations have used the same ecological modernization discourse 
used to attract investors and victims. One criminal company suggests: 
Bottom Line: It benefits everyone on the planet to help keep our wild 
spaces alive and growing. Embracing a greener lifestyle, means saving 
money on your energy use, improving your health, padding your bank 
balance, and ultimately, improving your overall quality of life and at the 
same time, you can preserve furry animals from becoming extinct. 
Most carbon credit organizations in the voluntary market, then, say their projects are a 
“beacon of ethical conduct.” This draws attention to the role of greening corporations as 
they will be able to do the “right thing” for stakeholders in companies concerned about 
environmental practices, as well as the “right thing” for the planet. Ironically, one 
illegally operating company suggests that it can even help customers obey confusing 
regulations by serving as a “regulatory and protocol advisory.” Thus, the role of green 
marketing in promoting an environmental ethic is influential for these companies to 
attract investors and victims. 
Economic Development 
Many legal and illegal organizations in the voluntary market (i.e., 15 out of 20 in 
the sample) promote consumer choice by offering different projects that can increase 
production. For example, a victim or investor could buy credits in hydro-electricity, 
reforestation, or other specific works in developing countries. These organizations 
advertised that they are “boosting local economies” and “production” and increasing 
jobs within those communities. Not only will investment be environmentally beneficial, 
but it will be socially and economically beneficial and provide a “great deal of 
meaning” for the investor by “helping other parts of the [less developed] world 
[develop].” Many times this discourse is emphasized by providing visual images (i.e., 
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pictures) of third world poverty on the marketing website. This serves to reinforce the 
“development” aspect of carbon dioxide commodification. For instance, one non-
criminal company notes: 
 We aim to promote projects that provide social and environmental 
benefits, create jobs and development in the local communities and entail 
a net transfer of wealth to deprived areas. 
That is, marketing targets victims and investors by focusing on doing good for the 
environment and the economy in “less developed” countries of the global South.  
Organizations suggest that consumption does not need to be reduced if people 
invest in the voluntary market. That is, promoting investments in environmentally 
sustainable and renewable technologies in countries that may not be accustomed to the 
same carbon intensive lifestyles will negate and balance CO2 emissions. This 
combination of current lifestyles (in developed countries) with offset projects 
(developing countries) is referred to as a “carbon green world.”  Investing in carbon 
offset projects is marketed as an “easy option”, for environmental reform, stimulating 
further interest in investment by arguing individuals or corporations will be engaging in 
environmentally friendly practices, without having to change their specific lifestyle. 
This process highlights the “win-win” scenario of environmental protection and 
economic prosperity for investors. 
Technological Innovation 
Ten out of twenty actors (50%) marketed technology as the “driving force” for 
environmental change, noting that it is possible to “offset unavoidable carbon footprint 
through projects.” Thus, the “use of clean and efficient technologies” is therefore often 
essential to the voluntary industry. Most organizations use technology and projects as 
equivalent. Projects that use less carbon than traditional production methods save 
19	  	  
money that can be invested elsewhere—such as in ethical development as previously 
suggested. For instance, one company describes its project as follows: 
We use the surplus funds from our wind turbines to support social and 
environmental projects in both our Indian and UK communities.  
Companies that sell credits claim that the demand for credits will only intensify as 
regulations are put in place and suggest that projects that employ technology are the 
way out of the problem. As a result, investment in technology is a solution to the 
production problem and a “wealth generating investment opportunity” that can be 
“presented for commercial use.” In short, the idea that technology will solve the 
problem is consistent voluntary market discourse for both criminal and non-criminal 
corporations.  
Discussion and Conclusion 
The research set out to examine the marketing strategies used by criminal and 
non-criminal organizations operating in voluntary carbon market with an aim of 
determining if there were major differences between the two sets of actors. That is, we 
might expect non-criminal organizations to advertise differently, perhaps stressing 
ethical behaviour more than criminal organizations. Finding a difference between 
criminal and non-criminal organizations might suggest that a criminal profile could be 
developed to help regulate the fraud in the market. However, we find little difference 
between the two types of organizations. Instead, there are consistent patterns with 
respect to what is advertised by both criminal and non-criminal organizations. As noted, 
both sets of actors focus on sustainability, ethical behaviour; economic development, 
and technological innovation. These themes are consistent with the idea that better 
forms of production -- that emphasize the environment -- can impact climate change. 
However, as noted in the critical environmental literature, market-based mechanisms are 
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not effective, do not address foundational ecological problems, and merely support 
opportunities for criminal activity (Pearse and Böhm 2015).  
As emphasized, the ideology of ecological modernization appears to be 
emphasized in the voluntary market and is focused on sustainability, ethical behavior, 
economic development, and technological innovation. Opportunities for crime are 
inherent in the structure of the carbon market via routine activities because they produce 
an easy target – a target that has been socialized to believe that investment in the market 
will make money and solve the climate change problem while simultaneously 
promoting social justice. 
The voluntary carbon market appears to promote two forms of crime. First, the 
international voluntary carbon market advertises and promotes a corporate view of 
being green that increases ecological disorganization by promoting production (Lynch 
& Stretesky 2003; Lynch et al. 2013). This idea is not new and several researchers 
outside criminology have made similar points. Schnaiberg (1980), for instance, 
suggested that market-based policy developments do not stimulate environmental and 
social action, it simply ‘greens’ capitalism, ensuring that it is immune from an 
ecological critique (see also Curran 2009). However, there is an important difference 
between our observations of the voluntary market and other critiques of ecological 
modernization. We find, for instance, that social themes have been merged with the 
voluntary carbon credit market, and ethical behavior (as emphasized by social and 
environmental justice) often appears alongside most claims of greening production. As a 
result, social justice and ecological justice are simultaneously marketed. 
Second, the market promotes traditional fraud and theft by using those marketing 
messages to appeal to victims who wish to be ‘green’ through investment. As a result, 
motivated offenders and victims come together in the marketplace because ecological 
21	  	  
modernization ideology is such a strong behavioural driving force. We emphasize that it 
is unlikely that government regulation will have a large impact on carbon crime in the 
voluntary market because ecological modernization ideology is hegemonic. That is, as 
long as offenders and victims operate within the powerful set of ideological conditions 
that legitimate ecological modernization opportunities, these crimes cannot be 
sufficiently reduced by guardianship. 
One potential bright spot in our analysis suggests that because traditional carbon 
crime is so embedded in the voluntary market it appears, as noted, uncontrollable. That 
is, criminal and non-criminal organizations are not distinguishable and draw upon the 
same themes to market to victims and investors. As a result, a contradiction emerges 
because as the level of fraud increases it may also sow the seeds of its own destruction. 
That is, the level of traditional crime in the carbon market may ultimately put an end to 
that market because of the erosion of public trust.  
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Endnotes 
[1]  Initial proposals for carbon markets were promoted heavily the United States and 
OECD countries (Bernstein et al. 2010). However, it is the EU ETS that has achieved 
greatest success compared to other involuntary and voluntary markets such as the New 
Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme (NZ ETS), California’s Cap and Trade Program 
and the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCE)(for a full review, see Hood 2010). 
[2]EMT is a response to environmental problems that argues these problems can be 
solved within capitalism.  Criticism of this perspective is found in the political economy 
literature, such as the treadmill of production (Schnaiberg 1980; Stretesky, Long and 
Lynch 2013) 
[3] The purpose of which was to create pro-active policy developments such as those 
identified in the publication of the Brundtland Report (1987) that considered the poor 
environmental records of western economies, multinational corporations and how these 
could be adapted to protect the welfare of the environment. Buttel (2000) argues that 
despite various and differing contributions about EMT, its implications for policy, such 
as the Brundtland Report, led to the radical transformation broader political-economic 
structures. This was through both a macro-economic shift transforming resource 
intensive industries to service and knowledge industries reorienting technological 
infrastructure and micro-economic shift proposing to and increasing clean technological 
developments that reduce negative effects on the environment (Gouldson and Murphy, 
1997).  
[4] The result is the restructuring of the the outcome of which, to has maintained the 
role of capitalist markets by that it has been argued can be restructured to remedy 
environmental problems (Revell, 2007).   
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[5] This is known as decoupling. This concept draws heavily on the notion of 
decoupling-that the economy can grow even as carbon toxic releases decline. 
[6] Give some examples of schemes that must be followed such as the European Union 
Emissions Trading System.  
[7] These projects can often be described as a form of “greenwashing.”  For example 
see Greer and Bruno (1996). 
 [8] Brisman and South (in press) present a similar argument about ecological 
modernization and water. Brisman, Avi and Nigel South. (in press) “State-corporate 
environmental harms and paradoxical interventions: Thoughts in honour of Stanley 
Cohen. In Raghnild Solund (ed.) Green Criminology and Political Activism. Palgrave. 
[9] Some of these websites have been removed from the internet. That is, once 
discovered by authorities they were taken down so as to not draw additional attention to 
the organization.  We were able, however, to locate 10 of the 13 websites. 
[10] Themes of ecological modernization used to explain legitimate trading 
organisations would likely be the same for illegal organisations, based on the 
assumption that they would use the same marketing and advertising techniques to attract 
victims as would a legitimate trader. 
[11] Eight out of ten organizations acted as both as a consultancy organization and a 
financial trader while the other two organizations were promoted as consultancy firms 
that work with financial traders. 
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Table 1. Legal and Illegal Carbon Trading Organizations  
and Ecological Modernization Themes 
 Legal Illegal  
Theme % Yes % Yes Significancea 
Sustainability 80% 70% 0.61 
 (8) (10)  
Ethical behaviour 100% 70% 0.06 
 (10) (7)  
Economic development 70% 80% 0.61 
 (7) (8)  
Technological innovation 70% 30% 0.07 
 (7) (3)  
Notes: ns are in parentheses. a The reported significance levels are 
calculated from chi-squared tests.  Due to the small sample sizes, we also 
calculated Fisher’s Exact test values.  In all cases the significance values 
were higher than the reported chi-square values. 
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Appendix 1. List of Legal and Illegal Carbon Trading Organizations  
in the Analysis 
Legal Illegal 
Blue Green Carbon Offsetting Capital Carbon Credits 
Carbon Managers Carbon Advisory Council 
Carbonica Carbon Credit International 
Clear the Carbon Offset Company Carbon Credit Offsetting 
Climate Care Carbon Credit Specialists 
Climate Stewards Carbon Green Solutions 
Sindicatum Sustainable Resources Carbon Solutions 
The Carbon Neutral Company EAC Consultancy 
The Converging World Green Carbon Direct Limited 
The Original Carbon Company Independent Carbon 
 
 
 
